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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, large numbers of ciphers using only addition, rotation and XOR have emerged, usually they are called ARX ciphers. Due to the simple operation and high efficiency in software and hardware, these ciphers usually have very good software and hardware performances. One typical application of this kind of ciphers is low resource devices such as sensor nodes and RFID tags.
Lightweight block cipher LEA [1] was proposed by Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea in 2013. It is a typical ARX block cipher and it provides a high-speed software encryption on generalpurpose processors. In the specification of LEA [1] , designers have a thorough investigation on the security level of LEA with a wide variety of cryptanalytic methods such as differential attack, linear attack, zero correlation attack, impossible differential attack and so on. Zero correlation linear cryptanalysis was firstly proposed by Andrey Bogdanov and Vicent Rijmen in 2011 [2] , [3] . Generally speaking, this cryptanalytic method can be concluded as "use linear approximation of probability 1/2 to eliminate the wrong key candidates". However, in this basic model of zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, the data complexity is about half of the full code book. The high data complexity greatly limits the application of this new method. In FSE 2012, multiple zero correlation linear cryptanalysis [4] was proposed which use multiple zero correlation linear approximations to reduce the data complexity. In this version of zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, although the data complexity can be reduced to some extent, however, multiple zero correlation linear cryptanalysis method is based on a strong hypothesis that all zero correlation linear approximations used are independent from each other. In ASIACRYPT 2012, integral zero correlation distinguisher and multidimensional zero correlation linear cryptanalysis model [5] were proposed. The data complexity for multidimensional zero correlation linear cryptanalysis is the same as multiple zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, however, it doesn't rely on the strong assumption. Nowadays, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis has been a new criterion to evaluate the security of newly proposed ciphers [6] - [10] .
In the specification of LEA [1] , the designers evaluated the security level on LEA against massive cryptanalytic methods such as differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis and zero correlation linear cryptanalysis etc. Among these attacks, boomerang attack seems to attack the longest rounds for LEA-128/192/256, which is 15/16/17 round respectively. And the rounds attacked with differential cryptanalysis, truncated differential cryptanalysis and impossible differential cryptanalysis seems to be a little shorter, which is 12/13/14 round respectively. For integral and zero correlation linear cryptanalysis, these two kinds of distinguishers seem to be much shorter than others, while the rounds attacked with these two methods are much shorter too. This paper reevaluates the security level on LEA family ciphers against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis.
Our contributions
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the security level of LEA family ciphers against zero correlation linear cryptanalysis. Firstly, we identify some 9-round zero correlation linear hulls which can attack all versions of 9-round LEA family ciphers. Secondly, we propose the first zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on 13-round LEA-192 and 14-round LEA-256. Compared with our results, the specification of LEA block ciphers just identified a 7-round zero correlation approximation and consider the possibility of 9-round attack for 128-bit keys, 10-round attack for 192-bit keys, and 11-round attack for 256-bit keys.
The summary of cryptanalysis on LEA family ciphers is concluded in the Table I below. This paper is organized as follows. LEA family ciphers are briefly introduced in Section 2. Section 3 proposes some key observations on LEA block ciphers which will be used in our cryptanalysis. In Section 4, first of all, some 9-round zero correlation linear hulls are proposed for all variants of LEA family ciphers. Then based on these newly proposed distinguishers, zero correlation linear cryptanalysis for 13-round LEA-192 and 14-round LEA-256 are proposed. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION ON LEA FAMILY CIPHERS
LEA has the block size of 128 bits and the key size of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The word size of LEA is 32 bits. The number of rounds is 24 for 128-bit keys, 28 for 192-bit keys, and 32 for 256-bit keys.
A. Notations
 P : a 128-bit plaintext, consisting of four 32-bit words ( , , , ) 
B. Round Function for Encryption and Decryption
The round function for LEA is computed as follows: (( 
C. Key Schedule
The key schedule uses the following eight constants for generating round keys.
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III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON LEA
In this section, we introduce two observations on LEA. These observations are used in the key recovery attacks in section 5. The first observation is partial arithmetic for module addition and the second observation is according to the key schedule. 
, f is a bijection.
IV. ZERO CORRELATION LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS ON LEA FAMILY CIPHERS
In this part, first of all, we propose a distinguishing attack on all variants of 9-round LEA block ciphers. Then zero correlation linear cryptanalysis on 13-round LEA-192 and 14-round LEA-256 are proposed.
A. Distinguishing Attack LEA and Zero Correlation
Linear Hulls on LEA In this section, a distinguishing attack that can be applied to all variants of 9-round LEA block ciphers is proposed, and the complexity of this attack is also analyzed. The procedure of the distinguishing attack is as follows: is LEA 9 , a random permutation otherwise.
To explore longer zero correlation linear hulls for LEA, we use an automatic approach which makes searching for all the single bit pattern of the input and output linear masks possible. For single bit pattern linear masks, we found hundreds of zero correlation linear hulls for LEA reduced to 8-round, however, only a few of them can be extended by one round, here are some zero correlation linear hulls for 9-round LEA (  is the linear mask of the input and  is the linear mask of the output): 
1) Complexity analysis
The data complexity of the distinguishing attack is () fx is LEA, it cannot be misjudged as a random permutation, otherwise, the probability that a random permutation is misjudged as LEA is This distinguishing attack can be applied to all versions of LEA block ciphers.
B. Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on LEA-192
In this section, based on the 9-round zero correlation linear hull The key recovery process can use partial-sum technique from step 1 to step 9 below: Step [
Step 2. Guess all possible values of 6 round key bits 13 13 13 13
Step 3 
Step 4. Allocate a counter vector
RK  . Altogether we should guess 60 key bits information. [
Step 5. Allocate a counter vector 
Step 7. In the first 6 steps of the attack, there are altogether 107 key bits information guessed. For any guessed subkey candidate, if 4 
2 , the guessed 107-bit subkey candidate is kept and discarded otherwise.
According to [3] , a wrong subkey candidate can be kept with probability of about   Ki may be a correct guess, otherwise, it should be eliminated.
Step 9. In the first 7 steps, there are altogether 107 bits information guessed, ideally, for a round key candidate, the space of the ( [0], [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] ) 
C. Zero Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis on LEA-256
If we add four rounds before and one round after the 9-round zero correlation linear hull, we can attack 14-round LEA-256. Similarly, the initial four rounds and final one round are illustrated in the Fig. 3 .
As the key schedule plays an important role in deciding the number of round key bits involved in, to make this relation clearer, we illustrate these correlations between the round keys and master keys in the Table IV below. 
The process of the attack is as follows:
Step 1. Allocate a counter vector 
